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RELIGIOUS TRIBUNALS AND THE ONTARIO ARBITRATION
ACT, 1991: THE CATALYST FOR CHANGE
SHELLEY MCGILL*
RtsuMg
L'introduction de la Loi de 1991 sur l'arbitrage en Ontario en 1992 a marqu6 le debut
d'une nouvelle politique en faveur du rbglement de litiges prives avec un minimum
d'intervention de la part des tribunaux. L'indtpendance des parties 6tait respecte en
ce qui concerne le choix de l'instance dtcisionnelle et le choix du rdgime de droit
applicable au litige. La proposition rdcente de tribunaux de la charia, qui applique-
raient le regime du droit musulman dans l'arbitrage priv6, a relanc6 le dtbat sur la
privatisation de la justice. Le d~bat met en contraste les principes et les objectifs du
mode alternatif de r~glement des conflits avec ceux de l'6galit6, du multiculturalisme
et du droit familial. Le gouvernement de l'Ontario nomma Marion Boyd, l'ex-procu-
reure gtn~rale de l'Ontario, et lui confia le mandat d'6tudier la possibilit6 de r~conci-
lier les politiques concurrentes. Le rapport Boyd, Resolution des diffirends en droit de
la famille: pour protdger le choix, pour promouvoir l'inclusion, fut publi6 en dtcembre
2004. Le rapport contient quarante-six recommandations qui proposent des change-
ments radicaux et une uniformisation des procedures de mddiation et d'arbitrage. I1
appuie l'arbitrage comme m~canisme de rbglement des diffdrends dans les cas de
conflits familiaux et les principes religieux comme choix possible en tant que r~gles
de droit applicables dans 'arbitrage priv6. Cet article examine les politiques divergen-
tes sous tendant le dtbat, fait une critique des recommandations Boyd et identifie
certains sujets de preoccupation.
T he recent proposal of sharia tribunals1 has initiated a debate centred on principles
in alternative dispute resolution (ADR), family law, and possible modifications
to the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991. In the report Protecting Choice Promoting Inclu-
sion, released in December 2004, Marion Boyd, former attorney general of Ontario,
attempts to balance these concerns. Forty-six recommendations propose sweeping
change and standardization to mediation and arbitration practice. Although many of
these recommendations relate only to the areas of family and inheritance law, one
cannot ignore the implications for arbitration practice as a whole.
* Shelley McGill is an assistant professor at Wilfrid Laurier University.
1. The Canadian Society of Muslims has introduced an arbitration panel called Islamic Institute
of Civil Justice & Muslim Court of Arbitration. See <http://www.muslim-canada.org/DAR-
LQADAMSHAH2.html>.
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INTRODUCTION
The existence of sharia tribunals raises a blend of policy and legal issues. The sharia
tribunals are created pursuant to the Ontario Arbitration Act, passed in 199 1.2 This Act
allows the use of arbitration as a means of resolving disputes using anyone as an
arbitrator and any law as the criterion for resolution. The resulting award may be
enforced through the court system without government scrutiny. The availability of
arbitration to the Muslim community means that Muslims could comply with one of
the tenets of their religion, which is to resolve disputes using sharia law.3 Section 32(1)
of the Arbitration Act requires an arbitration tribunal to "apply the rules of law
designated by the parties or, if none are designated, the rules of law it considers
appropriate in the circumstances". The argument has been made that sharia law may
be inconsistent with some principles of Ontario family and inheritance law, or prin-
ciples of equality of women, generally. Therefore, some are concerned that the arbi-
tration awards resulting from the application of sharia law may disadvantage women. 4
An additional concern is that parties may not voluntarily choose this forum but may
feel forced to choose it by their religious community. One of the hallmarks of the ADR
movement is the voluntary choice afforded to disputants in selecting the forum.
Finally, the private nature of arbitration means that abuses may not come to light. In
Canada, freedom of choice, equality, freedom of religion, and support of multicultu-
ralism are both legal and public policy principles; the existence of religious tribunals
affects all of these principles.
This is not the first religious tribunal to use the Arbitration Act, nor is it the first time
the Ontario Government has had to wrestle with the issue of ADR in the family law
context and the resulting risks to women. For many years, the Jewish community has
operated religious tribunals applying Jewish law. To date, little concern has been raised,
but potential revisions to the Arbitration Act would certainly affect their continued
existence. In 1998, Ontario adopted mandatory mediation as part of the court process
for most case-managed civil lawsuits. A great debate ensued over whether family law
2. Ontario Arbitration Act, S.O. 1991, c. 17. For an overview of the origin and interprovincial
comparisons of legislation see Murray A. Clemens, "Canadian Domestic Arbitration Legislation:
A Tapestry or Patchwork Quilt?" (2004) 13:2 Canadian Arbitration and Mediation Journal 9.
3. In this paper, the term sharia law refers to traditional Islamic law. The writer acknowledges that
the term has broad meaning, varied uses, and applications not restricted to religious, family, or
inheritance principles. This paper does not deal with the details of sharia law. For a discussion of
sharia law generally, see <http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia>.
4. See Natasha Bakht, "Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law. Examining Ontario's Arbitration Act
and Its Impact on Women," online: National Association of Women and the Law <http://www.
nawl.ca/brief-sharia.html>; Pamela Cross, "Private Dispute Resolution within Family Law: The
Intersection of Culture, Race Religion and Gender" (September 2004), online: Ontario
Women's Justice Network <http://www.owjn. org/issues/mediation/sharia.htm>; Alia Hogben,
"The Laws of the Land Must Protect All of Us, Irrespective of Gender or Religion," Editorial,
Toronto Star (1 June 2004); Marina Jimenez, "B'nai Brith Recommends Sharia-Based Tribunals"
Globe and Mail (9 September 2004), online: <http://www.globeandmail.com>.
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matters should be among those covered by mandatory mediation. Much of current
mediation practice was pioneered in the family law discipline. The concept of manda-
tory mediation may be illogical, in any event, since central to most ADR forums is the
free choice to use an alternative process. It was ultimately decided that this process
should not be forced on parties in a family dispute. The driving reason for this decision
was the potential for the process to disadvantage some women who may be less
powerful, less sophisticated, less educated, or abused.5 This is an important precedent,
given that a mediated result requires consent of the parties to both the process and the
outcome, while arbitration results in a binding adjudicated award imposed on the
parties.
GOVERNMENT REACTION
At the request of the Ontario Government, Marion Boyd embarked on a mandate to
"explore the use of private arbitration to resolve family and inheritance cases, and the
impact that using arbitrations may have on vulnerable people" 6 She received submis-
sions from many stakeholder groups including the Canadian Council of Muslim
Women (opposed) and B'nai Brith Canada (in support). 7 Before turning to the Boyd
recommendations, it is necessary to look at the four possible courses of action and
their ramifications. Generally, the Government has four alternatives, and Ms. Boyd
clearly favours the fourth.
1. It can do nothing (make no changes to either the Arbitration Act or the Family
Law Act) and allow the current checks and balances in the Acts to handle issues
of inequality, incapacity, unfairness, and discrimination.
2. It can isolate particular types of disputes based on substantive criteria and prohibit
the use of arbitration as a means of resolving these disputes (e.g. family law).
3. It can identify particular rules of law and prohibit the use of these principles as
criteria available to decide outcomes under s. 32 of the Arbitration Act (e.g.
religious principles).
5. For a further discussion of mandatory mediation in family matters see Civil justice Review:
Supplemental and Final Report (Toronto: Publications Ontario, November 1996) at 76; Sandra
A. Goundry, Yvonne Peters, & Rosalind Currie, Family Mediation in Canada: Implications for
Women's Equality (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1998), online: Status of Women Canada
<http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/pubspr/familymediation/familymediation-e.html>; Joan B.
Kelly, "Family Mediation Research: Is There Empirical Support for the Field?" (2004) 22:1-2
Conflict Resolution Quarterly 3-35 [Kelly].
6. Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion (Decem-
ber 2004) online: <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/ english/about/pubs/boyd> at 5
[Boyd].
7. Ibid. at 154.
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4. It can modify the current process outlined in the Arbitration Act to enhance the
existing checks and balances rather than relying on the party-initiated review
remedies after the fact. Changes could include
a. threshold requirements to be met prior to accessing the arbitration process
(independent legal advice),
b. escape opportunities after entering into an agreement to arbitrate but prior
to the commencement of the process,8
c. mandatory review requirements to ensure compliance with Ontario law, or
d. review as a mandatory requirement of those arbitration awards, seeking to
use the Court enforcement provisions. 9
1. ISSUES ARISING FROM THE STATUS Quo
Maintaining the status quo would be an affirmation of the fundamentals of arbitra-
tion. The cornerstones of ADR are the choice, privacy, speed, and affordability it offers
disputants; empowering parties to design the process leads to general satisfaction and
willingness to comply with the outcome. 10 The purpose of arbitration is not to mirror
the outcome of a court but rather to allow parties to design their own process and an
outcome that suits them. Arbitrations are private and do not create a precedent in
recognition of this party-specific focus. The current process is not without basic
protection. Biases of the arbitrator, fraud, incapacity, and inequality or unfairness in
the process are all reasons that a court may set aside an arbitration award.11 In addition,
appeals based on questions of law maybe made to the courts if the agreement permits.
In terms of enforcement, the court will enforce only those awards that are within its
jurisdiction to grant or it would have granted in similar circumstances. 12 A wide range
of safeguards are already in place.
However, critics identify voluntary choice of process as impossible if a religion requires
its members to use a religious tribunal. In arbitration, the outcome is not voluntary,
only the choice of process, so free and informed consent to the choice of process
becomes even more important than in mediation, where the outcome is agreed upon.
8. Section 5(4) of the Arbitration Act, S.O. 1991 c. 17 upholds agreements requiring arbitration
prior to court action known as Scott v. Avery clauses.
9. Section 50 of the Arbitration Act allows a judgment to be granted on the basis of an arbitration
award, provided there is no pending appeal or application to set aside.
10. See the Report on Mandatory Mediation 2001, for such things as settlement, speed, and satisfac-
tion, online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.
on.ca/english/courts/manmed/>; Kelly; Roselle L. Wissler, "Effectiveness of Court Connected
Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases" (2004) 22:1-2 Conflict Resolution Quarterly 55-88; Ernst &
Young, Outcomes of Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Consumer Lending Cases, online: National
Arbitration Forum <http://www.arb-forum.com/media/EY_2005.pdf>.
11. Supra note 2 at s. 46.
12. Supra note 2 at s. 50(7).
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Critics are not content with the current remedies, since they are after the fact and
depend on party initiative to bring the matter forward, within the prescribed time
limit. The concern is that the disadvantaged party will not be aware of the disadvantage
or the available remedy. In addition, there seems to be a general unwillingness of courts
to interfere in arbitration awards, agreed-upon settlements in family law, and relig-
ious-based awards or agreements. 13 Finally, an appeal to a court based on something
other than Ontario law would be unlikely to proceed.
There cannot be a debate about the appropriateness of any piece of legislation without
involving the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.14 Although no named group is
discriminated against by the current Arbitration Act, critics argue that the application
of the Act by religious tribunals would result in discrimination against women and
therefore would violate section 15.15 Section 27 could be argued as justification for
such discrimination in that it supports multiculturalism. Similarly, freedom of religion
can be argued in support of the status quo, as it is not the application of the Arbitration
Act that discriminates but the application of religious principles.
16
It is clear from the forty-six recommendations that Marion Boyd rejects the status quo,
and her reasons are reflected in the following passage:
Ontarians are open to allowing minority groups a considerable degree of cultural
and religious independence, so long as harm is not perceived to be done to the
larger community and its values of tolerance, accommodation and individual
autonomy.
17
2. ISSUES AROUND A BAN ON ARBITRATION FOR FAMILY DISPUTES
Is arbitration or ADR, in general, appropriate for family disputes?
The relevance of the risks of using an ADR process in family disputes depends on the
position of women and children in society, and whether family conflicts are seen as a
private matter best dealt with between the parties, or whether the public has a stake
in the resolution of these private disputes. Scholars have lamented the privatization
of family law specifically, and justice generally, claiming that it is not in the interests
of public policy that family issues be decided in private.' 8 The state has an interest in
13. Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550; Kaddoura v. Hammond, [1998] O.J. no. 5054.
14. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
15. The definition of discrimination includes circumstances where an already disadvantaged group
is affected by the legislation in a way different from the general public. Law v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [ 19911 1 S.C.R. 497 at para. 39.
16. Similar arguments were effective in League of Human Rights of B'Nai Brith Canada v. Syndicat
Northcrest, [2004] S.C.C. 47.
17. Boyd, supra note 6 at page 89.
18. Boyd, supra note 6 at 3; Ayelet Schachar, Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family law: The
(2005) 20 Journal of Law and Social Policy
the safety and custody of children. The Office of the Children's Lawyer is in place so
that the interests of the children maybe independently represented. 19 The state has an
interest in ensuring that children are supported by their parents rather than the
government. Women and children living in poverty become a burden on the state.
Property rights and support rights may be private, but they have a very public impact.
The introduction of child support guidelines by the Canadian government underlines
the public character of child support. Spousal support guidelines are under review. 20
Arbitration may be a commercial dispute-resolution practice that is now being too
generally applied to matters of public importance.
The dynamics of power in a spousal relationship are complicated, to say the least. An
important concern is that a woman who has been dominated during the relationship
may continue to be dominated during an ADR process, and this influence may affect
the fairness of the outcome. Power imbalances stem from a variety of sources including
a lack of resources, history of abuse, lack of education or employability, and cultural
background. Naturally, these factors often mean that women have less power in the
relationship than men. The resulting risk of domination may be greater in mediation,
where the outcome is negotiated and the dynamics between the parties play a greater
role than they do in arbitration outcome. However, the choice of arbitration, which
laws and which arbitrator, certainly affect the outcome. If placed in a tribunal setting
where their rights are not protected or monitored, women may be disadvantaged by
these choices and be powerless to avoid them. In Ontario, mandatory mediation has
excluded family law. Parties are free to use mediation if they choose, but this process
will not be forced upon them. A review of the rationale behind this choice is contained
in the Civil Justice Review Supplemental and Final Report.21 Quebec has a ban on
arbitration in family law disputes and has recently passed a resolution opposing the
establishment of Islamic tribunals. 22 British Columbia is currently looking at manda-
tory mediation in family disputes. At present, no province imposes mandatory media-
tion in family law disputes.
Conversely, it can be argued that the forgoing is an overly paternalistic view, which
may deny women freedom of choice of forum. People negotiate separation agreements
that do not mirror a possible court outcome all the time. The Family Law Act allows
Perils of Multicultural Accommodation, (1998) 6:3 Journal of Political Philosophy 285.
19. Office of the Children's Lawyer is a law department in the Ministry of the Attorney General that
represents the interests of children in custody and access and child protection cases, and ap-
proves settlements in civil litigation. See "More about What We Do," online: Ministry of the
Attorney General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/ocl/about.asp>.
20. Canada, "Developing Spousal Support Guidelines in Canada: Beginning the Discussion," online:
Department of Justice <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/spousal/6.html>.
21. Civil Justice Review, November 1996.
22. Article 2639, Civil Code of Qudbec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64; Quebec, National Assembly, 37th Legislature
1st session, Motion 26 May 2005, online: <http://www.assnat.qc.ca/eng/37legislaturel/Pv/
PA20050526.pdf>.
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the creation of domestic contracts and allows for their enforceability through the court
system.23 The current court infrastructure could not handle the volume of family cases
if alternative resolution processes were not available and encouraged.
24
Marion Boyd's first recommendation supports the continuation of arbitration in the
areas of family and inheritance law. The review did not find any evidence of systemic
discrimination against women in family law arbitration. Ms. Boyd's reasoning is
reflected at page 75 of the report:
I believe that arbitrations under the Arbitration Act are an area where the state
should refrain from preventing private parties from making contractual arrange-
ments about a variety of disputes, including family law and inheritance. There is no
question that there are serious concerns that should be addressed by strengthening
protections for those identified as vulnerable through legislative, regulatory or other
means.
3. EXCLUDING CHOICES OF LAW UNDER SECTION 32 OF THE ARBITRATION
ACT
In implementing this alternative, the government would have to ban all religious
standards as a choice of law. What is a religious standard, versus a choice of law, by
jurisdiction or culture? These are difficult distinctions to draw, given that some
religions involve an entire way of life. A religious ban would affect all other user groups,
such as the Jewish community. It would catch a wider group of disputes beyond just
family issues. The proposed sharia tribunals are not restricted to family law.
Naturally, section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms would be raised to argue
discrimination based on religion. It would be argued that a ban would violate freedom
of religion when one of the religious principles was to resolve disputes using religious
laws. It is arguable that the public policy interests rooted in family law and the
discrimination against women would be seen as justification under section 1 of the
Charter.25 However, this view may undermine multiculturalism as a policy goal.
Religion and family law are often intertwined. There is a long history of family
counselling in almost every religion. Section 57(5) of the Family Law Act anticipates
the religious influence on domestic agreements and the potential for conflict with
Ontario law. It allows such an agreement to be set aside when faith-based barriers have
been used as a factor.
Boyd's second recommendation supports the continued use of religious law as an
available choice of law for arbitrations, provided that the appropriate safeguards are
put in place:
23. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, ss. 51-60 (Part IV).
24. For settlement, speed, and satisfaction see the Report on Mandatory Mediation 2001, supra note
10.
25. Charter, supra note 14 at s. 27.
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People are entitled to make choices that others may perceive not to be correct, as
long as they are legally capable of making such choices and the choice is not prohib-
ited by law.26
4- CHANGING THE PROCESS To IMPROVE CURRENT CHECKS AND BALANCES
Should there be confirmation of capacity or free and informed choice before parties
may access arbitration?
Many submissions to the Boyd review suggested that requiring a certificate of inde-
pendent legal advice (ILA) prior to selecting a religious tribunal would ensure that the
choice was voluntary and informed. Two issues remain: timing and expertise. Timing
of the ILA certificate is pivotal. If ILA is required at the time of making the agreement
to arbitrate, then it will likely be years before the arbitration actually takes place. Many
domestic contracts are entered into prior to marriage. The women may have a change
in belief after marriage breakdown but be powerless to undo the previous decision if
it was made with ILA. There will likely be a significant change in the assets of the parties
between the ILA and the use of the process. If the ILA is acquired at the time of the
process, it will be more relevant. Currently, section 5(4) of the Arbitration Act upholds
the enforceability of "pre-dispute" arbitration clauses that require arbitration as a
condition precedent to a court (Scott v. Avery clauses 27). Such clauses are routinely
included in domestic contracts entered into at the outset of the relationship. The
combination of section 5(4) of the Arbitration Act and ILA would defeat the ability to
withdraw from such an agreement at the time the dispute arises.
Effective ILA means abolishing the Scott v. Avery exception in section 5(4) of the
Arbitration Act when dealing with family law disputes, so that the choice of a religious
tribunal is made using current opinions and beliefs, not those formed at the outset of a
relationship. A review of the provisions in the Family Law Act discloses a number of
topics that cannot be determined in a domestic contract, and choice of forum could
easily be added. This would have an impact broader than religious tribunals and,
therefore, may result in many more family disputes bypassing ADR and ending up in the
courts. All the reasons for encouraging ADR would then be undermined. This is an
unlikely position for the Government to take, given the enthusiasm of the Mandatory
Mediation Report of 2001.28 Recent changes to mandatory mediation mean that timelines
will be relaxed, and it will now be a requirement of cases involving less than $50,000.29
The content of the independent legal advice is another area of concern. Expertise in
Ontario family law should not be a problem for an Ontario lawyer, but finding a lawyer
26. Boyd, supra note 6 at 75.
27. [1843-60] All E.R. Rep. 1.
28. See the Report on Mandatory Mediation 2001, supra note 10.
29. Rule 24.1 Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 194 as amended to 0. Reg.
219/04, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C 43, as amended.
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with expertise in sharia law, as well, may be. The role of ILA is to ensure an informed
choice, so expertise in only one area of the choices of law may not satisfy the
requirement.
SHOULD THE COURT WAIT FOR THE PARTY To ASK FOR A REVIEW?
Mandatory substantive review would involve a review of the contents of arbitration
awards relating to family matters to ensure compliance with principles of equality,
fairness, and Ontario family law. This would be a mammoth undertaking requiring a
large resource allocation. If it were done for just religious tribunals, the Charter issue
of discrimination based on religion would be obvious. However, it does address the
problem of individual women not being aware enough to access the existing review
and appeal provisions. It addresses the public versus private issue of family law and
resolves an issue of unequal representation expertise at the tribunal hearing. In
contrast, it undermines any alternative choice of rule of law and turns arbitration into
nothing more than a pre-trial. Only parties who want to follow the outcome would be
obligated to do so, unless it complied with Ontario law. What standard for assessment
would be used? Family awards are very fact-based, and credibility-based factual
findings would not be lightly overturned. Review would amount to mandatory appeal,
while determining compliance would be virtually impossible, provided the result was
one that was possible in Ontario.
A less onerous possibility would be mandatory review of only those awards seeking
access to court enforcement provisions. This would be consistent with the court's
position in Kaddoura v. Hammond,30 where it refused to enforce an agreement that
had a religious purpose. It supports the concept that once the court is involved in
enforcing the award, it must meet Ontario law, and this point acknowledges that the
court may have a higher duty when it enforces the award. It respects the free choice of
individuals who are content and complying with an award. The Family Law Act takes
the more proactive approach in section 56(5), where an agreement may be set aside if
faith barriers to remarriage are included as part of the agreement. Additional clauses
on chastity and possession of the matrimonial home are unenforceable, the suggestion
being that this may not be real consideration or appropriate bargaining. Mandatory
review takes the teeth out of arbitration and reduces it to mediation where the outcome
is honoured if the parties agree with it.
BOYD RECOMMENDATIONS
Marion Boyd recommends modifying the current system to increase the protection
available to vulnerable individuals by ensuring free and informed consent and stand-
ardizing the system so problems may come to light. She falls short of recommending
mandatory review of arbitration awards and instead suggests that the government, not
30. [1998] O.J. No. 5054.
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the courts, should have a right to evaluate the outcomes. Ms. Boyd puts more emphasis
on regulating the arbitrator than reviewing the award.
In this contest (multiculturalism) I believe it is important to seek solutions that
attempt not only to respect the rights of minority groups in the larger cultural and
political context of Ontarian society, but also to ensure that individuals within that
minority, as citizens of this province, are able to exercise their rights as individuals
with the greatest of ease and with minimal cultural and personal risk.31
When reviewing the forty-six Boyd recommendations it is clear that they go beyond
the issue of religious tribunals and arbitration. Six of the first twenty recommenda-
tions cover both arbitration and mediation. Changes in recommendation 7 will apply
to minors in all domestic contracts. Many if not most of the recommendations relate
to all arbitrations in family or inheritance matters, not just those that choose religious
tribunals. This report represents sweeping change to family and inheritance arbitra-
tion specifically and probably foreshadows change in the arbitration of all disputes.
Recommendation 3 suggests that a domestic contract, as defined and regulated under
the Family Law Act, should include a mediation and arbitration agreement. No limit
is included here to apply to only those mediation or arbitration agreements that relate
to family matters. This recommendation would expand the opportunity for review
and avoidance of all arbitration agreements for the same reasons now offered to
domestic contracts. Surely it should be confined to those agreements relating to family
and inheritance matters.
INFORMED AND VOLUNTARY CONSENT: A Two-STAGE PROCESS
The recommendations address free and informed consent through a standardized
two-stage process:
1. Threshold requirements to be met prior to accessing the arbitration process
(Independent Legal Advice).
2. Escape opportunities are available after entering into an agreement to arbitrate
but prior to the commencement of the process.
Standardization of the process of family and inheritance arbitration would be affected
by regulating forms and procedures through either the Family Law Act or the Arbitra-
tion Act.3 2 This standardization is where the Boyd recommendations seek to handle
the issue of informed consent. The contents of arbitration agreements would include
a description of the protections existing in the Family Law Act and the Arbitration Act,
independent legal advice certificates or waivers, and acknowledgment of under-
standing of the religious principles to be used (if any). 33 In order to accomplish the
last, organizations offering religious tribunals would be obligated to produce a state-
31. Boyd, supra note 6 at page 94.
32. Ibid. Recommendation 10 at 134.
33. Ibid. Recommendation 12 & 13 at 135.
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ment of faith-based principles that must be distributed to all prospective clients.34 The
client must then take this statement to the independent legal advice appointment so
that a lawyer can review the statement and determine that the party has sufficient
information to understand the implications of the choice. 35 This process, combined
with a massive public education campaign, is designed to create informed consent.
One major problem with this proposal is that it gives the lawyer the responsibility of
ensuring that the parties have enough information in the statement of religious princi-
ples to "understand the nature and consequences of choosing the religious law" 36 A
lawyer cannot know this unless he or she is also an expert in the religious law. The lawyer
will not know if a pertinent piece of information is missing. Recommendation 21
requires independent legal advice to be given on Ontario and Canadian family, inheri-
tance, and arbitration law and remedies. It does not require that the advice come from
a lawyer, nor does it mention expertise in religious law. A lawyer cannot fulfill the
responsibilities set out in Recommendation 23 unless he or she is also an expert in the
religious law being chosen. Expertise remains an issue under the Boyd plan.
Recommendation 5 recognizes the timing problem when the choice of arbitration is
made well in advance of any dispute arising. Such a choice would now require a
confirmation at the time of the dispute, and before arbitration is commenced, in order
for arbitration to be binding. Reconfirmation as well as the original choice would all be
done in writing. Separation agreements would be an exception to the confirmation
requirement, presumably on the basis that the parties are already in dispute by the time
they enter into the separation agreement. However, the recommendations relating to
independent legal advice do not address the reconfirmation. Independent legal advice is
tied to the agreement, not the reconfirmation. Since the agreement is not binding unless
reconfirmed and a considerable amount of time could elapse between the original
agreement and reconfirmation, it seems logical that ILA is necessary at the time of
reconfirmation as well, or in the alternative. For independent legal advice, the timing,
the contents, and the expert are all problem areas still remaining after the Boyd recom-
mendations.
In addition to the legal advice and the previously mentioned public education cam-
paign, the issue of voluntary consent is addressed through the arbitrators and media-
tors. Arbitrators and mediators would be required to screen each party separately for
issues of power imbalance and domestic violence, using a standardized test developed
by the Ontario government with the help of existing professional organizations. 37 The
34. Ibid. Recommendations 16 & 17, at 136.
35. Ibid. Recommendations 22 & 23 at 137. The Ontario Association for Family Mediators already
has a policy on domestic abuse, which includes a presumption against mediation in cases of
domestic abuse. See <http://www.oafm.on.ca/mediators/abusepolicy.html>. Note that domestic
abuse is different from domestic violence.
36. Ibid. Recommendations 22 & 23 at 137.
37. Ibid. Recommendations 18 & 31 at 138, 139.
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timing is again tied to the arbitration agreement and not any subsequent reconfirma-
tion and suggests that the choice of mediator or arbitrator would be known at the time
of agreement rather than dispute. The arbitrator or mediator would then be required
to "certify" that he or she is satisfied that the parties are entering into the arbitration
voluntarily and with the knowledge of the nature and consequences of the arbitration
agreement. This is a new and undetermined liability issue for the mediator and
arbitrator. One would presume that if domestic violence has existed in the past,
relationship mediation is not an appropriate forum to resolve the dispute. This cannot
automatically be said of arbitration. The implications of domestic violence on volun-
tary consent may vary. If it is a prohibition to accessing arbitration, then this point
needs to be spelled out. The issue of power imbalance is more complicated. On the
other hand, power is a factor in almost all relationships, whether it stems from abuse,
wealth, education, or employability. An arbitrator or mediator will be hard-pressed to
find a relationship that has a completely equal power balance. The finding of an
imbalance would not normally rule out the choice of arbitration as a forum. The
judgment assessments that the arbitrator will be called upon to make are the source
of unknown liability issues, despite the fact that training in these areas is recom-
mended.38 Boyd has placed the responsibility for free and informed consent on the
lawyer and the arbitrator.
REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION
In an effort to ensure that mediators and arbitrators making these certifications are
equipped to do it, sweeping changes are proposed to arbitration and mediation practice.
Boyd shows a preference for supervising the quality of the arbitrator rather than the
quality of the award. Individual family and estate mediators and arbitrators would have
to be members of a professional organization with codes of conduct in order to have
their awards enforced. 39 Annual statistical reports, including the number of appeals and
complaints, would be sent to the government by the arbitrator as a way of monitoring
competency.40 The natural progression of these recommendations lead to Recommen-
dation 45, which calls for professional self-regulation of mediators and arbitrators in the
family and inheritance areas. It calls upon the government to study conduct and
competency issues with existing professional organizations and the Law Society of Upper
Canada. The ADR Institute of Canada, Inc., has membership criteria and chartered
designations that are the groundwork for a competency assessment. It has a code of
conduct and a structured arbitration process set out in its National Arbitration Rules. 41
38. Ibid. Recommendation 33 at 139.
39. Ibid. Recommendation 14 at 135. Most organizations such as Ontario Family Mediators Asso-
ciation and ADR Institute of Ontario have codes of conduct and membership requirements. The
ADR sections of the Ontario and the Canadian Bar Association also have codes of conduct.
40. Boyd, supra note 6, Recommendation 40 at 140.
41. "National Arbitration Rules," online: ADR Institute of Canada <http://www.adrontario.ca/na-
tionalarb rules.html>.
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It is not the choice of law or the award that Boyd seeks to regulate but rather the arbitrator
and mediator. The alternative nature of arbitration and mediation lies in the free choice of
professional and the alternative skills these professionals bring to the forum. Regulation and
standardization strike at the heart of these alternatives.
Broad implications also come from the recommendations that seek to address the private
nature of arbitration and the party-driven remedies currently available. Privacy is a
hallmark of the mediation and arbitration forums that is about to be eliminated.
Mandatory record-keeping will require arbitrators to keep records including exhibits,
ILA, and summary of the facts and reasons for a period of ten years.42 It is unclear
whether the summary of the facts refers to the summary of facts that would naturally be
contained in the written decision, or the private notes of the arbitrator. There is no
transcript of the proceeding, so these are the only two sources of such a summary. A
summary of the decision would be sent to the government and available to the public.
43
Apparently it would be a non-identifying copy, but one would have to remove much
more than the name of the parties in order to prevent the public or the media from
determining the identity of the parties. The purpose of such a summary is research,
evaluation, and consumer protection. Evaluation is a vague term that implies some
assessment of quality without reference to a criterion, process, or input from the
arbitrator. One would assume that the evaluation is being made by the government and
not the courts, since that is where the summary is to be sent. The report suggests
evaluation may be made in order to detect patterns. As mentioned earlier, failure to
comply with these recommendations would allow the award to be set aside and result in
loss of the arbitrators' membership in the professional organization.
44
The final recommendation opens the door for a mandatory court review of settlements
in family or inheritance cases where religious principles were applied but falls short
of recommending it. 45 This review would appear to apply beyond mediation and
arbitration to any settlement in the family or estate area involving religious principles.
No criteria for review are suggested, but they would likely be broader than those
already contemplated by the Family Law Act or the Arbitration Act where the result is
outside the jurisdiction of the court. This is a proposal for study only, as resource and
charter issues are considerable barriers to such a system.
CONCLUSION
In an effort to address the issues raised by religious tribunals while respecting an
individual's right to choose such a forum, the Boyd recommendations alter many of
the basic tenets of alternative dispute resolution. The Boyd recommendations propose
a standardized system regulating contents of the agreement, forms, screening, and
42. Boyd, supra note 6, Recommendation 38 at 140.
43. Ibid. Recommendations 39, 40, 41 at 140.
44. Ibid. Recommendations 42 & 20 at 141, 137.
45. Ibid. Recommendation 46 at 142.
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independent legal advice, choice of professional, and structure of both the mediation
and arbitration professions as a whole. They sacrifice the private nature of arbitration
by requiring mandatory record retention and reporting to the government. Summaries
of decisions would be available to the public and for unknown "evaluation" purposes.
The recommendations shift the responsibility and risk for the choice of a religious
tribunal to the lawyers, mediators, and arbitrators through broad ILA and screening
requirements. These changes strike at the very heart of ADR processes. It is hard to
imagine that such sweeping changes could be contained to the family arbitration and
mediation profession. Professionals at large in alternative dispute resolution should
expect to be embraced by a new regime.
POSTSCRIPT
After the release of this paper but before its publication, the Ontario Government
made two statements indicating that it will reject the Boyd recommendations in their
entirety.
On 8 September 2005, the attorney general issued a written press release saying that
there would be "no binding family arbitration in Ontario that uses rules or laws that
discriminate against women." 46 This statement makes no reference to faith-based or
religious principles. It contemplates a substantive assessment of any choice of law to
determine if it discriminates against women.
Almost immediately, on 11 September 2005, the premier of Ontario made the follow-
ing oral statement to the press: "There will be no sharia law in Ontario. There will be
no religious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one law for all Ontarians." 47 Con-
trary to the attorney general's press release, this statement contemplates an absolute
ban on any "religious" choice of law without a substantive assessment of the discrimi-
natory nature of the principles. If there is to be one law for all Ontarians, then there
will be no choice of law what so ever. This change removes more than just religious
principles. This would be a major change in arbitration policy. The comments are
general in nature, but the entire context of the premier's remarks suggests that these
restrictions would apply to family arbitration only.
Since the two statements take different approaches, it is difficult to determine exactly
what changes will appear in the draft legislation expected in the fall of 2005.
46. Ministry of the Attorney General, News Release, "Statement by Attorney General on the Arbitra-
tion Act (8 September 2005), online: <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/
2005/20050908-arb 1991 .asp>.
47. Natalie Alcoba, "Ontario Rejects Sharia Law" National Post (12 September 2005).
